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Abstract
In  an anonymous collection of treatises Fides et ratio was published in Amsterdam.
The voluminous work of several authors contains a fierce critique of Locke’s notion of faith
and the moderate Enlightenment’s conception of a reasonable Christianity.The sympathiser
with mystic theology Pierre Poiret (–) wrote the general introduction. In the
preface Poiret outlined a counter philosophy. However, the book deserves the interest of
modern scholars because of the notions of religion and faith conceived by its authors. They
are basically modern. Fides et ratio exemplifies the intense intellectual connections between
Great Britain, the Netherlands and the German hinterland during the early modern period.
The authors of the collection were part of an international non-denominational web. With
some exceptions relations between the philosophes and the counter philosophers among
the illuminati are neglected in modern research. In the final parts of this essay it will be
argued that the ideas on faith and the ensuing separation of religion and the state created a
common ground between Poiret and Christian Thomasius, the luminary of early German
Enlightenment, who for some years had been directly influenced by the former’s ideas.
Keywords
Pierre Poiret, mystic theology in early Enlightenment, critique of confessionalism and a state
church
. Introduction
In  an anonymous collection of treatises dealing with the relationship
between faith and reason was published in Amsterdam.1 The voluminous work
1) Fides et ratio collatae, ac suo utraque loco redditae, adversus principia Joannis Lockii. Insertus
non paucis quibus revelationis divinae ac religionis christianae capita digniora … explicantur.
Cum accessione triplici . De fide implicata, sive nuda. . De SS. Scripturarum certitudine ac
sensu. . De perfectione et felicitate in hac vida, edidit et praefatus est Petrus Poiret (Amsterdam,
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of several authors, entitled Fides et ratio, contains a fierce critique of Locke’s
notion of faith and his conception of a reasonable Christianity. The former
Cartesian philosopher and present sympathiser with mystic theology Pierre
Poiret (–) wrote the general introduction. He deemed the father
of British empiricism and luminary of moderate Enlightenment a personifi-
cation of an impious rationalism. The subordination of faith to reason, he
observed, would destroy the essentially practical and redeeming nature of faith.
In the preface Poiret outlined a famous counter philosophy. However, the
book deserves our interest because of the notions of religion and faith cre-
ated by its authors. They are basically modern, although the authors intro-
duced them within the context of pre-modern philosophy and mystic theol-
ogy.2 These tracts with their mark of ‘Old Philosophy’ show the development
of an individualistic—‘modern’—view of religion, well before the end of the
Ancien Régime and the confessional state. Starting from this collection of tracts
the first part of this essay (sections –) will focus on Poiret’s notion of faith
and religion.
What is more, Fides et ratio exemplified the intense intellectual connections
between Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the German hinterland during
the early modern period. The authors of the collection were part of an inter-
national non-denominational web. Their views represent the ideas of a group
of like-minded souls. Notwithstanding the important theological and philo-
sophical differences between the dissenting ‘Christians without the church’
(Kolakowski) both the Jansenists in France, the Collegiants in the Netherlands,
and the Pietists in Germany considered an individual inner light of the spirit to
be the only true guide to religion and they all disliked orthodox theology, the
established churches, and the confessional state.3 Their ideals paved the way
for the modern view of religion that is free from constricting confessions and
). Poiret’s preface is separately paginated. Although at the time a—now lost—Dutch
translation appeared and in  an English one without the three appendices, the book
nowadays is rare. See Stephan Hobhouse, ‘Fides et Ratio: The Book which introduced Jacob
Boehme to William Law,’ The Journal of Theological Studies  (), –, there
. Five copies are preserved in Great Britain, two in the Netherlands, and about ten
in Germany. For the Dutch translation: ‘De vita et scriptis commentariolum,’ Posthuma
(Amsterdam, ), §, p. . A Dutch version of Poiret’s biography is included in the
 translation of L’Oeconomie Divine (see below, n. ), separately paginated –.
2) A context neglected by scholars with the notable exception of Gustav A. Krieg’s thesis,
Die Theologie Pierre Poirets, ihr Werden und Wesen (Bonn, ), pp. –.
3) On their affinities, see Heinz Schilling, ‘Das konfessionelle Europa. Die Konfessional-
isierung der europäischen Länder seit Mitte des . Jahrhundert und ihre Folgen für Staat,
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an established church. Arguing in this manner outmoded philosophers and
religious thinkers such as Poiret happened to endorse the same comprehensive
religious toleration called for by the new philosophers of the Radical Enlight-
enment. This coincidence between intellectual ‘right’ and ‘left’ dates from the
beginning of philosophical rationalism as Marijke Spies observed: “Increasing
professionalization gave rise to a relatively large middle class of institution-
ally trained or self-educated persons who placed ultimate faith in their own
judgement. The growing emphasis on the inner religious life, observable both
inside and outside the churches, and the increase in rationalism were two sides
of the same individualistic coin.”4 With some exceptions relations between the
philosophes and the counter philosophers among the illuminati are neglected in
modern research.5 In the final part of this essay (section ) it will be argued that
the ideas on faith and the ensuing separation of religion and the state created
a common ground between Poiret and Christian Thomasius, the luminary of
early German Enlightenment, who for some years had been directly influenced
by the former’s ideas.
. The Collection
Fides et ratio consists of a preface written by Poiret, an anonymous main section
and three appendices, anonymous as well. The main section consists of two
parts: the first part summarizes in  theses Locke’s religious epistemology and
was originally written in English by a Scottish disciple of Locke.6 The second
part is an elaborate refutation in  sections and was written in Latin.7 In
the final part the writer urged upon the reader to imitate the example of the
Roman Catholic mystic Antoinette Bourignon.8 This may be taken as a sign
that Poiret himself was the author. For after reading some of her works he left
Gesellschaft und Kultur,’ in Ausgewählte Abhandlungen zur europäischen Reformations- und
Konfessionsgeschichte, ed. L. Schirn-Schütte and Olaf Mörke (Berlin, ), p. .
4) Willem Frijhoff and Marijke Spies, : Hard-Won Unity, trans. M. Heerspink Scholz
(Assen, ), p. .
5) Jørn Schøsler, ‘Le Christianisme Raisonnable et le débat sur le “socianisme” de John
Locke dans la presse française de la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle,’ Lias  (),
– and Andrew C. Fix, Prophecy and Reason: The Dutch Collegiants in the Early
Enlightenment (Princeton, ), pp. –.
6) ‘Praefatio editoris,’ Fides et ratio, §, p. .
7) Ibid., §, p. .
8) ‘Animadversationes,’ Fides et ratio, §, p. .
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the ministry in order to follow the pious virgin.9 However, both Poiret himself
and his first biographer observed that he was only the editor.10 What is more,
in the text the notion of faith is explained by means of the German words treu
und glauben, clearly hinting at a German origin of the author.11
Three additional treatises follow the main section. According to Poiret the
first treatise is the partial translation of a German tract entitled Die stete
Freude des Geistes. The title, Poiret observed, would have been ‘heaven on
earth’ if that title was not already in use for a “recently published famous and
stigmatized Dutch book.”12 Here Poiret refers to the Hemel op aarde (),
a notoriously Spinozistic work of the Zwolle minister Frederik van Leenhof
(–). The third tract was published in German in  by a “lover
of truth.”13 This “lover of truth” was Wolf baron von Metternich. Born about
 he became an envoy for the three Hohenzollern rulers in the Chamber of
Princes at the Imperial Diet at Regensburg. He died in . Just like Poiret,
Metternich, though a protestant by descent, was deeply influenced by Roman
Catholic mystics, above all Fénelon, and Madame Guyon, maintaining an
eager correspondence with her, ranging from  till December , a few
weeks before her death. Their letters were written in an affectionate language
and deal with all kinds of personal and spiritualmatters, but they never touched
upon the subject of confession or the need for conversion. Hence, Poiret
and Metternich had in common that they may be called in the language
of the age ‘indifferentists,’ that is to say persons indifferent to the diverse
confessions and churches. Poiret explicitly addressed not only the members of
his own confession, but all Christians whatever their confession, since “tous
les honnêtes gens de tous les partis, Catholiques, Romains, Luthériens, ou
Réformés, ont témoigné qu’on y trouve les vérités essentielles de la religion
chrétienne, nécessaires et suffisantes au salut.”14 Hence, tolerance of every ‘sect’
such as practised in the free Dutch Republic is essential to true religion.15
9) ‘De vita et scriptis,’ §, p. . See Marjolaine Chevallier, Pierre Poiret –: du
protestantisme à la mystique (Geneva, ), pp. –.
10) ‘Praefatio editoris,’ Fides et ratio, p.  and ‘De vita et scriptis,’ §, p. .
11) ‘Animadversationes,’ Fides et ratio, §, p. .
12) ‘Praefatio,’ Fides et ratio, §, pp. –: “libellus notus et notatus.”
13) Ibid., §, p. .
14) MaxWieser, Der sentimentale Mensch (Berlin, ), pp. –. The quotation is taken
from Chevallier, Pierre Poiret (see above, n. ), p. .
15) According to Wieser (ibid.) Irenicum universale oder gründliche Gewissens ruhe (Amster-
dam, ), p. , the German translation of La paix des bonnes ames. (The phrase not in
the French original.)
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Although the main treatise may be attributed to Von Metternich, Poiret
summarized the ideas as being his own.16 It is obvious that both Metternich
and Poiret were members of a whole network of like-minded men and women
who shared some basic ideas on faith and religion and kept in touch with each
other beyond the national and confessional boundaries.
It might be argued that early modern philosophy and intellectual life in gen-
eral was a pan-European phenomenon. This quite naturally applies to ideas
expressed in Latin, the lingua franca of the educated elite, far into the eigh-
teenth century. However, the ideas expressed in the vernacular languages also
circulated smoothly. In such cases necessary translations were readily made.
This applies to Poiret: of his more philosophical works such as the Cogita-
tiones rationales, De eruditione, Vera et Cognita omnium prima, and Fides et
ratio only Latin editions were published, but of his numerous popular works
Latin, French, Dutch, German, and English versions are recorded. These ful-
filled the need of the literate, but not academic readers. Apparently not only
scholars entertained the ideals of an international Respublica litteraria,17 but
also the general educated public, the readers of Le Clerc’s Bibliothèque uni-
verselle et historique which reviewed books “en quelque langue qu’ils soient
écrits.”18
. Poiret’s Biography
In order to grasp the ideas on faith and religion in Fides et ratio set forth by
Poiret and his circle of friends an outline of the life and writings of the edi-
tor will be of some use. Poiret was born into a Reformed family in Metz. He
studied theology at Basel, where he encountered Cartesianism. He became
greatly interested in the ideas of the philosopher and according to his first
biographer the reading of his works filled him with joy. He took Descartes
as his guide and the Frenchman’s ideas entered into every nerve of his phi-
losophy. Poiret befriended Johann Rudolf Wettstein (–), the Basel
professor of New Testament theology, who opposed the Consensus Helveti-
cus, the confession of the Swiss Reformed churches, and his son Heinrich,
who after the settlement of both friends in Amsterdam became his lifelong
16) ‘Praefatio editoris,’ Fides et ratio, §–, pp. –.
17) See the inaugural address of H. Bots, Republiek der letteren, ideaal en werkelijkheid
(Amsterdam, ).
18) H. Bots et al. (eds.),De Bibliothèque universelle et historique (–), een periodiek
als trefpunt van geletterd Europa (Amsterdam, ), p. .
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publisher. They shared an open dislike for the established churches. La paix
des bonnes âmes, an open letter he wrote after the revocation of the Edict of
Nantes, clearly illustrates Poiret’s anti-confessionalism and the irenic stance of
his thought. He invited the Huguenots to have no remorse if they were forced
to confess or to have communion, both being only unimportant external cer-
emonies: “L’essentiel de la religion Chrétienne consistoit dans le coeur & que
les céremonies n’etoient un accessoire.”19 Hence, true religion is of a practical
nature.
In the preface of a Latin edition of Bourignon’s letters Poiret argued for the
primarily moral nature of her teaching. Quoting Cor. ,: “The kingdom
of God is not a matter of talk but of virtue,” he observed that Christianity does
not consist in external ceremonies, the professing of words and formularies, or
believing in certain established opinions, but it is the way and means to obtain
our bliss.20
After Basel he left for Heidelberg where he studied German andDutch mys-
tical and religious writings, such as the anonymousHet boeck der ghetuygenissen
van den verborgen Acker-schat (The book of the testimonies about the treasure
hidden in the field) written about , Tauler’sTheologia Deutsch andThomas
à Kempen’s Imitatio Christi, translating them all into French. In the “Avis au
lecteur” of the last book Poiret explained his interest in mystical literature by
underscoring their moral significance. For Thomas à Kempen’s principal aim
was to teach all Christians the difference between virtue and vice. By adopting
Christ’s way of life, man will be liberated from the tomb of sin and hatred.
What is more, mystical theology is of a popular, and not of a scholarly nature.
For, in order to teach the common people how to overcome the desire for evil
and to free the intellect of its love of vain things, it has to be simple, without
embellishment and refinement.21 However, Poiret always denied being a mys-
19) La paix des bonnes ames dans tous les parties du christianisme (Amsterdam, ), p. 
(Modern reprint by Marlojaine Chevallier (Geneva, ), p. ). Answering the objection
that the adoration of bread in the mass is idolatry, Poiret observed (p. ): “Je voudrois
bien sçavoir quel mal on fait de croire que Jesus Christ soit dans l’Eucharistie. Et quand on
le croid de bonne foy sur ce qu’il le peut & qu’il l’a dit sans s’alambiquer beaucoup sur le
comment n’est ce-pas un éxercise admirable de foy, d’humilité & d’abnégation admirable
de la raison humaine & corrumpue?”
20) ‘Ad lectorem,’ Virtutum christianarum insinuatio facilis et quibisvis accomodata, ed. et
praefatus Petrus Poiret (Amsterdam, ), pp. *v–*v.
21) ‘Avis au lecteur,’Kempis commun, ou Les quatre livres de l’imitation de Jesus-Christ, traduits
pour l’edification commune de tous les Chrétien (Amsterdam, ), pp. *v–*v.
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tical theologian. “I never wrote a work of mystical theology myself. I did not
think myself capable of doing so. Even less I ever included myself among those
who are enlightened.”22 He merely wrote its “historia.”23
Mystical theology is of a moral nature, since it follows from the obser-
vation of the essence of Christianity: love and peace.24 Since Poiret—and
Bourignon—believed that such examples of Christian life were to be found
in every church or sect, their irenism is directly linked to their interest in mys-
tical theology.
In  Poiret became a Reformed minister. However, after a spiritual crisis
in  he left the ministry and dedicated his life to God alone.25 Nevertheless
he did not renounce the world completely and in  his first philosophi-
cal work, the Cogitationes rationales de Deo anima et malo, was published in
Amsterdam. The book went through three editions during his life. The first
edition was a straightforward rational theology of a Cartesian mould applying
the Cartesian method of clear and distinct ideas to the main theological issues.
The second, completely reworked, edition shows less appreciation of human
reason and Cartesianism, adding a detailed criticism of Spinoza whose philos-
ophy symbolised the errors of reason unenlightened by the light of God. In the
last edition of the Cogitationes an unfavourable survey of Bayle is added. Like
Spinoza the philosophe de Rotterdam used the impious methodus curiositatis.26
The fundamental opposition of a false, ‘atheistic’ philosophy and real wisdom
created by the light of God is the pivotal theme of Poiret’s second philosoph-
ical work, De eruditione solida, superficiaria, et falsa. The book, preceded by a
treatise on method, was first published in  in Amsterdam.
Shortly after  Poiret went to the Netherlands, where he aided Bourig-
nonwith the realisation of her plans to establish a non-confessional community
22) ‘Vindiciae,’ Posthuma I, , , p. .
23) ‘Auctoris praefatio ad lectores,’Theologiae pacificae, itemque mysticae, ac hujus auctorum,
idea brevior (Amsterdam, ), p. *r. See Max Wieser, Peter Poiret, der Vater der roma-
nischen Mystik in Deutschland (Munich, ), p. .
24) ‘Theologiae mysticae idea generalis,’ Theologiae pacificae, p. . In the general outline
of mystical theology included in his survey of mystical authors, Poiret described as its aim
the purification of man’s spiritual nature by God and his unification with the Creator. In
this sense mystical theology is one and the same with religion. In a stricter sense mystical
theology is practised by a small group of “holy men and women.” The story of the religious
and spiritual life of these “religious specialists” recorded in mystical literature is an inspiring
example to the other Christians.
25) ‘De vita et scriptis,’ §, p. .
26) ‘Dissertatio nova,’ Cogitationes, rd ed. (Amsterdam, ), §, p. .
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on Noordstrand, an island off the North-Frisian coast. After Bourignon’s death
in  Poiret edited her works, which earlier had been published by Jan
Rieuwerts, who published Spinoza’s works as well.27 In  he, like Spinoza
before him, moved from Amsterdam to Rijnsburg, where among the remnants
of the Collegiant movement he spent the rest of his life till his death in
.
. General Ideas
A survey of the general philosophical and theological ideas cherished by Poiret
will be helpful as well. According to Brucker’s Historia critica Poiret was a
“theosophist,” that is to say “a strange philosopher who consider the human
intellect to be closed off from the light of truth in such a manner that the
divine supernatural light is required to restore its function as principle of know-
ing.” Hence, “only those few men beloved by God” believe themselves to be
in the possession of the philosophical wisdom concealed to others.28 His intel-
lectual evolution is described in terms of an abrupt shift from Cartesianism
to mysticism. “Influenced by an uneducated, zealous and visionary woman
he got astray in all follies of mystical theology and destroyed with his arrows
all philosophical reason and the sciences.”29 According to Bayle and Le Clerc
he renounced “l’esprit du monde” and become a “philosophe enthousiaste.”30
Hazard reproduced this judgment by observing that “Madame Guyon and
Poiret were by no means the least considerable of those who professed the the-
ology of the heart. It was useless to try to put down these Enthusiasts; useless to
attempt to repress them by force. As for appealing to reason, what was the use
of that with people who declined to recognize that reason had any jurisdiction
in the matter? (…) they came to seeking God in their own pathological disor-
ders, in stark lunacy.”31 At the end ofThe European mind Hazard underscored
the antagonism between the sciences and Cartesian philosophy in particular
on the one hand and the sentimentalism of these mystical “illuminati” on the
27) M. de Baar, ‘Ik moet spreken.’ Het spiritueel leiderschap van Antoinette Bourignon (–
) (Zutphen, ). On Rieuwertsz, see pp. –.
28) J.J. Brucker, Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabulis ad nostram usqve aetatem
deducta,  vols. (Leipzig, ), : .
29) Historia critica , pp. –.
30) G. Mori, Tra Descartes e Bayle, Poiret e la teodicea (Bologna, ), p. .
31) P. Hazard, The European mind, trans. J. Lewis May (Hammondsworth, ), pp. 
and .
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other. In order to substantiate this claim Hazard refers to Bayle’s article on
Bourignon, which related some unhappy conferences of the virgin with Dutch
Cartesians in Amsterdam.32
Indeed, the mature Poiret consistently rejected philosophical reason. A the-
ology and philosophy based on reason alone barred man from realising his end.
Men misguided by reason are like the prisoners in Plato’s cave. On the fron-
tispiece ofDe eruditione solida, superficiaria et falsa the three forms of erudition
are depicted. False human knowledge is symbolized by men who have at their
feet the great books of human knowledge: Homer, Ovid, Aristotle, and the
Opera philosophica. The last title presumably refers to Descartes, since under
this title a well-known editon of his collected works was published by Else-
vier in the seventeenth century. This assumption is substantiated by a phrase
in the title: “The errors of human knowledge and of Cartesianism in particular
detected.” At the top of a highmountain on a throne real knowledge is dwelling
with the sun in his hand dissipating all obscurities and illuminating our mind
by his rays. A small detail in this print, which is worthy of attention, is the few
persons in the middle ascending the small path towards solid erudition. They
are near a narrow gate with a knocker. The three simple persons are a humble
man, a woman and a child. They symbolize the true Christian.
Poiret, however, had no sympathy with fideism, or scepticism. “Who in the
possession of a healthy mind is in doubt about things which are beyond all
doubt? (…) It would be blasphemous to argue that we cannot know God from
his ways and his works and to blame Him by saying that no understanding
is possible of the most solid and essential truths.”33 This proof is as certain as
mathematical reasoning.34 On the contrary, it is rationalism which opens the
gate to scepticism: “Rationalist philosophers are like men who go a few steps
towards their goal, but at the first problem they encounter, they pull up and
are blind standing before the truth.”35 They decry human weakness, but “will
be brought to their sense by sending them to cooks and gardeners.”36 Only
sensible persons without too much reading in ancient and modern books and
32) Dictionaire historique et critique,  vols. (Amsterdam, ), : –.
33) ‘Preface,’ §, L’Oeconomie Divine ou système universel et démontré des oeuvres et des
desseins de Dieu envers les Hommes, où l’on explique et prouve d’origine les principes et les veritez
de la nature et de la grace de la philosophie (Amsterdam, ).
34) Ibid., §: “Les témoignages que je rend à la vérité,” Poiret presumed are “autant ou
plus démonstrative que les vérités de la géométrie.”
35) Ibid., §.
36) Ibid., §.
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lacking the prejudices of the schools are able to understand the truths proposed
to them by comprehending the nature of things. “La critique,” that is to say
humanist learning is rejected. However, Poiret not only joined the tradition
of the docta ignorantia, but his third main philosophical work Economie divine
was explicitly aimed not at scholars, but at the literate public in general.Thanks
to Poiret and others theology became a subject of discussion at courts and in
salons.37
The preceding biography makes obvious that in Poiret’s life the encounter
withMadame Bourignon produced no abrupt shift from Cartesianism to mys-
ticism. Notwithstanding all his criticism of human reason till the end of his life
he retained his interest in philosophy. This is obvious from the Discursus prae-
liminaris, the introduction to the second edition of the Cogitationes rationales
written in , i.e., after his rejection of philosophical reason. According to
Poiret all philosophy aims at real happiness by acquiring knowledge of the
Truth.38 Poiret adopted the Cartesian principle that all philosophy starts with
the examination of the mind. The primary fact of consciousness is its impo-
tence to exist by itself and by its own light. Hence, the knowledge of truth is
only possible if themind associates itself with the source of all Truth, God, error
and sin being the effect of an aversion of the mind fromHim. Certainty is only
possible if we are overwhelmed by the absolute clarity of the divine light. The
resulting absence of doubt provides us with the ultimate peace, he observed
quoting Augustine’s Confessiones , “our heart is restless, until it repose in
Thee.”39
With respect to this focus on the mind Cartesian and Augustinian influ-
ences intermingle.40 However, a basic Cartesian feature of Cartesianism is the
highlighting of method. The mature Poiret retained this obsession. Hence, a
methodical treatise, entitled De vera methodo inveniendi verum, preceded De
eruditione solida. Poiret conceived his method as an emendation of Descartes’s
method developed in theMeditationes de Prima philosophia. The third rule for-
mulates the Cartesian principle that the scrutiny of our consciousness is the
37) Hazard, The European mind (see above, n. ), p.  and Mori, Tra Descartes e Bayle
(see above, n. ), pp. –.
38) ‘Discursus praeliminaris,’ Cogitationum rationalium de Deo, anima, et malo libri quatuor,
in quibus quid de hisce Cartesius, ejusque sequaces boni senserint, omnisque philosophiae certiora
fundamenta, atque in primis tota metaphysica verior continentur nec non Benedicti de Spinoza
Atheismus (Amsterdam, ), p. .
39) ‘Discursus praeliminaris,’ p. .
40) Gustav A. Krieg, Der mystische Kreis, Wesen und Werden der Theologie Pierre Poirets
(Göttingen, ), pp. –.
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commencement of all knowledge.—A Neoplatonic element in his philosophy
is the overall significance he attributes to the tripartite structure of reality. For
the mind presents itself as a desiring being, experiencing its deprivations and
its affections. Afterwards the mind becomes conscious of its faculty to perceive
objects outside the mind and finally its power to receive joy by finding peace
in the objects is perceived.—The second stage of the philosophical method is
that the mind by contemplating itself acquires the notion of a being that is the
cause of my being and all other creatures.41—Introspection leads to the discov-
ery of three kinds of truths as well: spiritual or mental truths, material truths
about the bodies in the natural world, and rational truths about ideas, that is
to say the shadows, or lifeless pictures of things.42These three kinds correspond
with three human faculties: passive intellect, the senses, and human reason or
active intellect, and three powers producing these truths: the divine light, the
natural light, and the light of reason.43
By making light crucial in his epistemology, Poiret follows the Augustinian
tradition of illumination claiming that all knowledge is due to an external
light. By the divine light we know God and our minds, if our intellect remains
passive. However, if the mind uses the light of human reason, we see only the
ideas created by ourselves, pointless pictures representing nothing in reality.
Hence Descartes’s arbitrary notion of truth devised by human reason is to be
rejected. Poiret argues for a criterion derived from the nature of the things.44
The last three rules deal with the impediments themind encounters in knowing
things. Faith being a direct relationship between God and the believer, the
method implies the rejection of all traditional religious authority.
In the Preface of Fides et ratio Poiret presents an outline of his thought. In
the first section he argues that eternal life is the end of the Christian religion.45
Such an eternal life consists in the perfection of the most essential parts in man.
In order to acquire this perfection the restoration of the initial communication
of man with God is required. The principle means of restoration is faith,
produced both byGod’s light and love and the corresponding response of man’s
basic faculties: intellect, will, and desire. In spite of the actual doctrines of the
different confessions, Poiret discerns in this matter a basic consensus between




45) ‘Praefatio editoris,’ Fides et ratio, §, p. .
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Protestants and Roman Catholics, if we take the trouble to understand their
doctrines properly.46 Here, as usual, Poiret underlines the minimal role of the
mind in the knowing process with the following argument: all knowledge is
produced by a light shining into the intellect. “This light is either divine, or
human.” However, if the light is human, that is to say human reason, divine
faith will never be acquired. Therefore, Poiret concluded, “the light must be
altogether divine.” For the knowledge human reason produces is only imag-
inary and false. Hence it is of no effect.47 It is Satan, who uses human rea-
son inducing man to substitute inane means for real ones. In order to deceive
men effectively, the Devil of old employed scholars and rationalist philoso-
phers, as history demonstrates. Among the Jews there were the Pharisees and
the Cabalists, among the Christians the Pelagians and the Socinians.48 How-
ever, this evil is not restricted to history alone, since according to Poiret in
his own time this threat is spreading more and more among the Christians,
among scholars in particular. The rise in Roman Catholicism of a sect of new
philosophers, which prefer reason to faith—Poiret refers to Malebranche—is
the Satan’s doing, while Protestantism is infected by Arminianism, which sub-
jected Revelation and Scripture to reason. One of those rationalists is Joannes
Lockius, “a subtle, eloquent and methodical philosopher as well.”49 According
to Poiret Locke plays a part in the eternal tragedy of human history; the eter-
nal struggle between rationalism and faith. Poiret substantiates his claim by
referring to the fourth book of the Essay and The Reasonableness of Christian-
ity, supplied by references to texts of Leclerc.50 In the fourth and last section
of the Preface Poiret once again turns to the theme of method, so pivotal in
Cartesianism. Here he presents his method in two steps. First, the philoso-
pher has to free his mind from prejudices—both preconceived notions and
ego-centred affects. Secondly, the philosopher is obliged to cultivate the roots
of good will in him. This method is also adopted by some pagan philoso-
phers.51 Apparently in his concept of an irenic religion Poiret even included
non-Christians.
46) Ibid., §, p. .
47) Ibid., §, p. .
48) Ibid., §, p. .
49) Ibid., §, p. .
50) Ibid., §–, pp. –.
51) Ibid., §–, pp. –.
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. Locke in Fides et ratio
In the introduction of Fides et Ratio Poiret takes Locke to task. For the lat-
ter’s method is based on the rejection of the mind’s innate notions and the
human instincts for the truth, the good and the just. Locke pretended that
every principle is either directly known by the senses or indirectly by means
of reasoning. What an utter absurdity! The principles derived in this way are
principia idealia, that is to say man-forged principles fabricated according to
the norms of reason. Instead of the natural and solid basics of our duties a
powerless and ineffective foundation is laid. What is more, Locke’s denial of
innate ideas misconceives the nature of the mind. Indeed, God is the creator
of human nature, and in this nature He inserted his light, power, and motions,
expressing in this manner his truth, goodness, and justice and enabling man
to return to his origin. Here Poiret refers to the traditional doctrine of man
being created in the image of God.The consequence is that according to Poiret
Locke is unable to account for the notion of a natural law “written into the
hearts of men,” which not only the apostle St. Paul argued for, but pagan
philosophers as well. He concludes by presenting two very long quotations
one taken from the beginning of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations III, while the
other is taken fromOnmysteries of the Neo-platonic third-century philosopher
Iamblichus, each running for more than a page. It should be noted that appar-
ently Poiret—by presenting these long references—readily endorsed both the
dynamism and teleology of ancient, non-Christian, naturalism and knowledge
about the gods coexistent with our nature.52 “Nor should we examine [such
knowledge] as though we were in a position either to assent to it or to reject
it; for it is rather the case that we are enveloped by the divine presence and
we are filled with it.” These notions are to be adopted by all Christian philoso-
phers.53
In the main section of Fides et ratio by an unknown Scot an outline of
book IV chapter  of the Essay is presented. From the fourth edition of
the Essay onwards Locke added a chapter (ch. ) denouncing enthusiasm.
He observed that enthusiasm rises from “the conceits of a warm and over-
weening Brain,” and is “founded neither on Reason nor Divine Revelation.”
52) Ibid., §, pp. –.
53) Ibid., §, pp. –. The translation is taken from the modern English version by
Emma C. Clarke et al., On the Mysteries, I (Atlanta ), ch. , p. . Poiret quotes from
the  Oxford edition. The argument confirms Mori’s idea of a “regresso di Poiret verso
forme di pensere pre-cartesiane,” Tra Descartes e Bayle (see above, n. ), p. .
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The Enthusiasts believe “whatever groundless opinion comes to settle it self
strongly upon their Fancies, is an Illumination of the spirit of God.”54 These
lines from the Essaymake obvious that Locke contended with the “enthusiasm”
of “Christians without the church.” Since Locke and other Enlightenment
philosophers focussed their philosophical energy on the denouncement of the
enthusiasm of the illuminati, “enthusiasm” or “schwärmerei” is deemed by some
the “anti-self ” of Enlightenment.55
Although Fides et ratiowas written after the publication of the fourth edition
of the Essay in , the anonymous author merely summarised chapter .
He defined: “Reason as an assent to a proposition because of its own evidence,”
while “Faith is an assent upon the credit of God.”56 Hence faith requires
revelation and testimonies. After proposition  the problem of false revelation
is addressed, because “experience of all ages demonstrates that men have been
mistaken in this affair accounting that divine revelation, which was not.”57 In
order to solve this problem the Scot unambiguously established Reason as the
criterion of faith: we know for certain that a revelation proceeds from God
only by reason. “This certain knowledge must be attained either by reason or
by Faith: not by Faith; otherwise it must presuppose itself and there will be a
procession to infinity; therefore by reason.”58
After these general remarks the Scot entered into details of Locke’s the-
ory: in the case of traditional revelation, we have to know beforehand that
the person whose testimony we have faith in, is sincere, not deceiving him-
self and knowing the right meaning of the texts. In short: the persons we
believe in must be reliable and reasonable. In the case of a direct revelation
by God reason has to rule out the natural and supernatural causes which oth-
erwise might produce such a testimony. Only if I know that none of these
causes did produce the testimony I have firm evidence that the revelation pro-
ceeded from God. It is obvious that this inquiry is to be made by reason.
Hence, reason is the criterion by which faith is to be judged. Without this
54) An Essay concerning Human Understanding IV, ,  and , .
55) J.G.A. Pocock, ‘Enthusiasm:The Antiself of Enlightenment,’ in Enthusiasm and Enlight-
enment in Europe, –, ed. Lawrence E. Klein and Anthony J. La Vopa (San Marino
Cal. ), pp. –.
56) ‘Theses de ratione prae fide,’ Fides et ratio, pp. –. The interpretations of Locke’s
distinction differ wildly, see David C. Snyder, ‘Faith and Reason in Locke’s Essay,’ Journal
of the History of ideas  (), p. .
57) ‘Theses de ratione prae fide,’ Fides et ratio, p. .
58) Ibid., p. .
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criterion it is impossible to distinguish between true and false revelation and
we are a prey of every kind of prophet, “seducing spirit,” or seer of visions.59
In the Animadversationes the author—Von Metternich?—rejects Locke’s
definition of reason on formal and material grounds. Locke violates the basic
rule of logic that in a definition the definiens is convertible with the definiendum
and finally the phrase “the evidence of a proposition” is obscure.60 He wrongly
does not take into account the different kinds of clear and distinct perception:
of “the natural bodies by means of the external senses, of spiritual beings by
means of the internal senses.” Absent objects we perceive indirectly by means
of the ideas or images left by the things in our memory.61 The author of
the Animadversationes continues by distinguishing between active and passive
ideas, or images. Our mind entertains passive ideas if our intellect merely
contemplates the impressions the senses receive from their internal or external
objects. However, we have active ideas if the intellect partly fashions the idea
of an object.62
Although this epistemological theory is slightly different from Poiret’s, the
common ground is clear: the source of all real knowledge is the external light,
which enables us to see the things as they really are and human reason a faculty,
by which man is “apt to commit many errors.”63 It is obvious that after the
initial pages the author lost all interest in Locke’s ideas on reason and went his
own way.
To Locke’s definition of faith the author pays even less attention. It is a
folly to call a particular act of assent the essence of faith, he argues. For assent-
ing upon the credit of God renders the act in scholastic terms a secondary
act. Ironically he calls Locke’s definition a brilliant invention, to be reckoned
among the novelties of this so-called most enlightened age—inventum illumi-
natissimi seculi—this text might well be one of the first to use the word in
a cultural-historical sense.64 The weakness of Locke’s definition induces the
author of the Animadversationes to present another definition by starting from
a natural law premise. The all-wise God created man for a perfect end. But
without giving man the means and the faculties to achieve his goal, God would
not be all-good. A denial of this premise would be blasphemy. Hence man is
59) Ibid., p. .
60) ‘Animadversationes,’ Fides et ratio, pp. –.
61) Ibid., pp. –.
62) Ibid., pp. –.
63) Ibid., pp.  and .
64) Ibid., p. .
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created both with a natural inclination towards the Good and a natural instinct
to know God.65 The knowledge of God resulting from this tendency has to
be called faith, since it is given to man by the divine light. Faith in its basic
sense implies piety, fidelity, simplicity, and the love of God. Hence, faith is
primarily a habit guiding man towards his end and does not require insight
into deep mysteries or controversies. He rejected the traditional orthodox view
identifying the substance of faith as the assent to a creed consisting of a greater
of smaller number of articles. “He who properly understood all this, easily
acknowledges the immense absurdity of reducing the divine faith to some
articles to be adhered to by force, for it is only God who is inviting us to know
all the things necessary, to refrain from arrogance, from deciding all things in
a high-handed manner and from censuring one’s brother in one way or the
other.”66
On the one hand Reformed orthodoxy turns the medicine of faith into a
poison by seeking a vain comfort in the most pernicious fiction of predestina-
tion,67 on the other hand Locke’s definition of faith is off the mark.68 We do
not believe by a man’s authority, but because he inspires piety. This argument
amounts to a strong plea to the reliance upon one’s own religious experiences
produced by the divine light in our soul.69 According to the Animadversationes
the Biblical principle “a tree is known by its fruit” applies to revelation, that
is to say the experience of God’s redeeming presence in our mind.70 In Fides
et ratio it is the individual who is facing the problem of demarcation between
faith and unbelief in his own life. However, Locke dealt with the problem from
a social point of view: what is the creed one must believe to be admitted to the
Church.
. The Illuminate Concept of Faith and Modernity
A basic claim Jonathan Israel advances in Enlightenment Contested is the dual-
ity of a moderate and a radical Enlightenment. The two versions of Enlight-
enment thought represent two rival interpretations of man and the universe:
one seeking for comprise between tradition and renewal, between Christian
65) Ibid., p. .
66) Ibid., p. .
67) Ibid., p. .
68) Ibid., p. .
69) Ibid., pp. –.
70) Ibid., p. .
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faith and philosophy, and the other being radical, democratic, and egalitar-
ian. This rivalry, Israel observed, is reflected in the diverse notions of tolera-
tion. The moderate Enlightenment proclaimed a limited notion of toleration.
Locke’s theory, for example, stems form theological premises, toleration being
essentially an “immunity from the form of worship otherwise generally pre-
scribed by the sovereign, through the state church.” The Radical Enlighten-
ment, however, proclaimed a comprehensive toleration, considering the con-
science of each man to be the unassailable sanctuary of his religious and moral
truth.71 Both versions of Enlightenment, Israel urged, raised the anger of a still
more widely supported Counter-Enlightenment, totally rejecting reason and
decrying philosophy as a whole.72
According to Israel Poiret is a staunch partisan of Counter-Enlightenment.
In Radical Enlightenment he had observed that Poiret from a luminary of
Cartesianism became a mystical recluse who “recoiled from Cartesianism and
all philosophy based on reason and science. Henceforth, he launched a one-
man crusade from his retreat in the Dutch village of Rijnsburg (…) against
modern philosophy and the entire Early Enlightenment.”73 Pascal and Bossuet
launched comparable assaults on rational theology.
Although Israel’s scheme is, in general, extremely useful, it precludes us
from acknowledging some affinities with respect to faith and religion between
Poiret and his circle on the one hand and some Enlightenment (moderate)
philosophers on the other. First, it should be noted that Poiret’s intellectual
background was markedly different from Pascal’s and Bossuet’s. His ideas
were rooted in the religious movement originating from the Reformation,
asserting that the Reformation was incomplete if in religious life the origi-
nal direct and substantially free relationship between God and the individ-
ual believer was not restored. This movement was in Germany from Luther
onwards denounced by Lutheran orthodoxy and was called in Germany by the
abusive term schwärmerei, or elsewhere “enthusiasm.” It consisted of Anabap-
tists, Quakers, Collegiants, and afterwards Pietists, groups Kolakowski called
“Christians without a church.” The link of Poiret with this movement is
71) J. Israel, Enlightenment Contested, Philosophy, Modernity and the Emancipation of Man
– (Oxford, ), pp. –.
72) Ibid., pp. –.
73) J. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, Philosophy, Modernity and the Making of Modernity
– (Oxford, ), p. . Cf. Enlightenment Contested (see above, n. ), p. ,
where Israel approvingly quotes Diderot’s words: “Pierre Poiret perverted theology, blighted
philosophy, and generally clouded the human mind.”
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obvious. For in the second part of his life he lived among people who attached
little importance to the main confessions, seeking to practise a private inward
Christianity and to promote an anti-dogmatic religiosity. Poiret’s intellectual
endeavours to conceptualise such forms of belief were readily accepted in
German pietism and other adversaries of orthodoxy.
Secondly, it may be argued that the opposition between the philosophes and
the “enthusiasts” was not always clear-cut.The jurist and philosopher Christian
Thomasius (–), who long has been regarded as one of the first and
most influential representatives of the early Enlightenment, was during the
s interested in Poiret’s ideas and even wrote a sympathetic introduction
to the  German edition of De eruditione.74 After a general survey of his
thought Thomasius turns to his definition of faith. Happily, he urged, Poiret
did not focus on the “unity of a confession” but on the “unity of love of God.”
Therefore “among the faithful there is no sect or Church, but they are all
brothers.”75 Hence Thomasius adopted the irenism of the “Christians without
the Church” and expressed his feelings of revulsion against the theological
controversies on the Eucharist. “These clerics abjure reason and love” and
deceive the laity.76 Doctrines are only metaphors, which are derived from the
things familiar to man and represent God “imperfectly and improperly.”77
Moreover, although Thomasius rejected Poiret’s physics, he wholeheartedly
agreed with his theistic epistemology.78 The base of all knowledge is our desire
to know God and his Creation, he urged, a desire frustrated by Sin and the
affects. Only God is able to remove these impediments, so the divine light is
required in order that we know. Where human reason is active, it leads the
mind, passive by its own nature, into error. In this mannerThomasius adopted
Poiret’s quietism: our bliss, the “intellectual love of the mind is a gift of God.
We are unable to acquire this state on our own account, as Spinoza maintained.
The divine wisdom is in the eyes of the world foolishness.” The manifest
simplicity of the Bible resists all efforts to accommodate the divine message
74) Thomas Ahnert, ‘Enthusiasm and Enlightenment: Faith and Philosophy in theThought
of Christian Thomasius,’Modern Intellectual History  (), –, there –.
75) ‘Dissertatio ad Petri Poireti libros de eruditione,’ ProgrammataThomasiana et alia scripta
similia breviora conjunctim edita cum notis (Halle/Leipzig, ), p. . About Poiret he
approvingly observed, p. : “de secta noli esse soliticus,” hence “nec pietas nec sapientia
sectam curat.” A member of any church whatsoever is a real Christian “si Deum timet et in
viis ejus ambulat.”
76) ‘Dissertatio ad Petri Poireti libros de eruditione,’ p. : “quicquid delirarunt hi clerici.”
77) Ibid., p. .
78) Ibid., p. .
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to whatever philosophy.79 Hence, both Thomasius and Poiret attempted to
separate religious truth from the pursuit of secular erudition and true religion
from the established churches.
Thomasius’s views exposed him to the charge of enthusiasm from the ortho-
dox theologians and he modified his ideas from the s onwards.80 In 
Thomasius wrote a new introduction to Poiret’s De eruditione, once more in
print. In the first section he added to Poiret’s theory of the three kinds of
knowledge the opposition between natural and theological erudition.81 The
first kind concerns human happiness in this life, the second human bliss in
the afterlife. What is more, Thomasius now opposed mystical theology being
“contaminated by the pagan philosophy of Plato.” The writings of Antoinette
Bourignon once acclaimed were now described as “dangerous and leading to
enthusiasm.”82 However, Thomasius did not consider Poiret himself to be an
enthusiast, although the latter’s doctrine does not provide for the means to
distinguish between real faith and this kind of superstition.83
Modern commentators argued that if Thomasius was influenced by the reli-
gious mysticism of the “Christians without the church.” This influence lasted
only briefly in the s.84However, notwithstandingThomasius’s incisive cri-
tique of “mystical theology,” he clearly continued to share the ideas on religion,
church and faith cherished by Poiret and his circle.85 Arguing for a “free con-
fession, and a church merely consisting of a free gathering of the faithful,” he
concluded that religion is simple and easily to be learned.86 Thomasius’s con-
tinued sympathy for these religious ideas is obvious from his Cautions with
respect to the principles of jurisprudence. Although in the Preface he once more
stated his changed opinion on mystical theology, he held on to his conviction
79) Ibid., p. .
80) See for example Ahnert, ‘Enthusiasm and Enlightenment’ (see above, n. ), –.
81) ‘Dissertatio nova ad Petri Poireti libros de eruditione,’ Programmata Thomasiana (see
above, n. ), pp. –.
82) Ibid., p. .
83) Ibid., p. .
84) Ahnert, ‘Enthusiasm and Enlightenment’ (se above, n. ), .
85) Lisolette Neisser, Christian Thomasius und seine Beziehungen zum Pietismus (Munich,
), pp. – and FrankGrunert, ‘Antiklerikalismus und christlicher Anspruch imWerk
von Christian Thomasius,’ in Les lumières et leur combat, ed. Jean Mondot (Berlin, ),
pp. –.
86) Horst Dreitzel, ‘Christliche Aufklärung durch fürstlichen Absolutismus.Thomasius und
die Destruktion des frühneuzeitlichen Konfessionsstaates,’ in Christian Thomasius (–
), ed. Friedrich Vollhardt (Tübingen, ), p. .
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that all knowledge should be useful, that is to say ultimately leading to man’s
end, felicity and eternal bliss satisfying our real desires. However, our natural
faculties are darkened by sin. Our folly, therefore, exists by nature. That is why
“our longing for the true good, being the primary part of living knowledge is
impossible without insight into our misery.”87 Such recognition requires con-
trition. The most important means to achieve wisdom Thomasius continues
to maintain even after his withdrawal from pietism, is prayer, complete bliss
being a supernatural gift from God. In this religious epistemology both pagan
philosophy and scholasticism are rejected. Hence Thomasius admonished the
scholar to read the Bible and neglect the modern “Tullians and Macchiavel-
lians.”88
In religion all men are equal and the hierarchies in the established churches
are to be rejected. One of the secrets of such an ecclesiastical Papism is the
extortion of power from the faithful, pretending that “only the acts of the
clergy glorify God.”89 Thomasius also stood by Poiret’s irenism.The theologian
had to practise piety and refrain from all hatred of heretics, since controversies
in religion are generally caused by philosophical doctrine. The only decisive
criterion for faith is our own conscience.90
Continuing to adhere to such ideas, it is no surprise thatThomasius was still
willing to recommend De eruditione: “We confess to finding many excellent
things in these books”:91 the need tomoderate the claims of reason, and to reject
current philosophy (communis philosophia).92 As before Thomasius remained
committed to a docta ignorantia, since reason obscures the divine mysteries
and he still joined Poiret in his struggle against “vain speculation,” that is to
say the investigation of unknowable and useless things. This learned ignorance
implies that all men should be granted the liberty to philosophize.93
87) Cautelæ circa præcognita jurisprudentiæ in usum auditorii Thomasiani (Halle, ), I,
p. : “desiderum veri boni tanquam pars prima cognitionis vivae sine agnitione propriae
miseriae esse nequit.”
88) Ibid., II, p. .
89) Ibid., I, p. .
90) Ibid., XIX, pp. , , .
91) ‘Dissertatio nova,’ p. .
92) Ibid., p. .
93) Ibid., p. . In his ‘Defensio methodi inveniendi verum,’ Posthuma, p. , Poiret
responded by arguing that he did not reject reason at all. For he did supply a criterion for
distinguishing between real divine revelations and enthusiasm: unanimity. Assuming that
the mind is really free from human fantasies, the testimonies of the divine light will be
speaking with one voice, which proclaims the simple moral message of Christ.
Henri Adrien Krop / CHRC . () – 
Thomas Ahnert concluded that in Thomasius philosophical and religious
ideas were “closely dependent on each other” and more in general that in
the first quarter of the eighteenth century in Germany no significant thinker
believed that “reason could be the measure of revealed truth.” His religious
ideas contributed directly to some of “the main intellectual currents of the
German Enlightenment.”94
The Enlightenment put an end to a society based on tradition and confes-
sion sanctioned by State, Church, and University.95 The fraud and unchristian
ideological base of the Old Regime Thomasius summarized by writing: “Faith
is equated with a creed and Catholicity with all articles the subjects are forced
to believe”;96 that is to say sanctioned by the State.
Thus, notwithstanding their intellectual and philosophical differences, both
the enlightened philosophes and the illuminati of Poiret’s circle had a common
cause: the struggle against the confessional State and State enforced eccle-
siastical confessions. The renewal of religion aspired to by non-confessional
denominations became possible after “the structural necessity of the coalition
between the early modern state and confessionalism had vanished.”97 Hence,
the destruction of established confessions and a comprehensive tolerance was
pleaded for by both the philosophes and the “enthusiast” religious groups Poiret
belonged to.
Dr. Henri A. Krop
Associate Professor in the History of Philosophy
Faculty of History and Arts
Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box , NL— DR Rotterdam
krop@fwb.eur.nl
94) Ahnert, ‘Enthusiasm and Enlightenment’ (see above, n. ), –.
95) Israel, Radical Enlightenment (see above, n. ), pp. –.
96) Christian Thomasius, Theses inaugurales de jure principis circa haereticos (Halle, ),
p. .
97) Schilling, ‘Das konfessionelle Europa’ (see above, n. ), pp. –.

